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Rail networks are real-life examples of complex networks and critical logistic and economic 
contributors to the wellbeing of society. Natural or human-caused hazards leading to the 
disruptions of rail network’s components can cause severe consequences including significant 
economic impacts. Therefore, analyzing rail networks and further reducing the impacts of 
potential disruptions are critical in order to manage risks to the performance of rail networks. 
Based on existing research on rail networks, this thesis proposes a methodology to analyze the 
rail networks with a large number of nodes, links, and complex connectivity from topological 
perspectives. Additionally, topology enhancement prior to failures and recovery strategies post to 
failures are used to reduce the impacts of potential failures based on vulnerability and resilience 
assessments. The analysis results of two case studies, the Amtrak and Class I rail networks, 
indicate that the proposed methodology is well suited to analyze and enhance the topology, 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Railroads serve as an effective and reliable transportation mode that is a critical logistic, social, 
and economic contributor to the wellbeing of society. Natural and human-caused hazards can 
seriously affect every component of a railroad, especially if it leads to the failure of rails and 
stations. This thesis mainly focuses on the analysis of rail networks composed of rails and 
stations to measure vulnerability and resilience from network topological perspectives. Such an 
analysis informs decisions on rail network enhancement and recovery strategies in order to 
reduce the impacts of disruptions on rail networks consisting of rails and stations, and more 
broadly on railroad systems. This chapter starts by highlighting the significance and criticality of 
railroads, and then defines the work breakdown structure of a typical railroad system. A rail 
network, a real-life example of complex networks consisting of two infrastructures component 
types of rails and stations, is also introduced. Finally, the needs in studying the rail network are 
identified as a basis for the research performed in this thesis.  
 
1.1 Significance and Criticality of Railroads 
1.1.1 Significance of Railroads 
A key mode of transporting passengers and freight is by trains on rails. The railroad in the United 
States (U.S.)  is recognized as one of the most complete and dynamic worldwide. In the 1990s, 
the ridership of U.S. railroad passenger transportation was more than 20 million people a year 
(Morrison 1990), while the ridership had increased more than 1.5 times by 2016, exceeding 30 
million (Amtrak 2016). Increasingly Americans choose to travel by trains, and the annual 
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ridership is still growing. The transportation of goods relies more on freight railroads than other 
transportation modes. For example, in 2019, U.S. freight railroads transported more than 4 
million carloads of coal, which exceeded 70 percent of U.S. coal to its destination. This coal 
transported by freight railroads was used to power 78 percent of the electricity in American 
homes (Association of American Railroads 2019). Hence, railroads, which have undertaken the 
majority of passenger and freight transportation, are an important economic and social 
contributor to the wellbeing of a society. In 2019, the U.S. railroad supported more than 1 
million jobs, earned more than $91 billion in revenue, nearly $71 billion wages, and paid almost 
$26 billion in taxes (Association of American Railroads 2019). 
 
1.1.2 Criticality of Railroads in Case of Disruptions 
Railroads are vulnerable to natural and human-caused hazards. For example, hurricane Alicia in 
1983 caused $3 billion in damage in southeastern Texas. The greatest impact of this hurricane 
was the inability of the railroad to perform its normal functions, i.e., the failure of the railroads. 
The storm surge caused the failure of 6km freight railroads in the area between Texas City 
Junction and Virginia Point. Additionally, railroads in other parts of Texas were out of service 
for four days (Byers 2011). Railroads are vulnerable to disruptions caused by natural hazards, 
such as hurricanes and earthquakes. These natural events can easily lead to the failure of rails, 
stations, power supply, trains, and operation systems. Once railroad components fail at a 
location, all railroad operations connected to this location are affected. As a consequence, a large 
area of railroad passenger transportation and the flow of cargo are delayed or even stopped. 
Chinowsky et al. (2019) indicated that in the U.S., increased temperatures due to climate change 
could cause rail deformation, causing delay-minute costs between $35 and $60 billion (in 2019 
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values) accumulated through 2100 under a high greenhouse gas emission. In China, the 2008 ice 
storm caused severe disruptions of railroads in southern China. The railroad passenger 
transportation throughout China almost shut down. Over 5 million travelers were delayed; the 
direct economic losses totaled $22.3 million in the fiscal year 2008 (Chen and Wang 2019). Janić 
(2018) reported that the 2011 Tohoku Earthquake caused the failure of Japan Shinkansen 
railroads in the northeast region. The entire transportation service of Japan Shinkansen railroad 
was delayed, causing a total cumulative cost for 92 days (from 11/04/2011 to 08/07/2011) of 
nearly $12.2 million (estimated values in June 2012). 
 
1.2 Railroads in the United States  
1.2.1 Passenger Railroads: Amtrak 
The National Railroad Passenger Corporation, usually called Amtrak, is a for-profit, quasi-public 
corporation founded in 1971. Amtrak railroads contain three types of rails: long-distance, state-
supported, and the northeast corridor, which cumulatively serve more than 510 stations in North 
America, including 46 U.S. states, Washington D.C and three Canadian provinces. The entire 
Amtrak route is more than 21,400 miles in length. As an important transportation mode for the 
American people, customers made more than 87,000 trips on an average day in 2018. Over 300 
trains were on the rail every day (Amtrak 2018). Increasingly people are choosing to travel by 
train. According to data from Amtrak, the ridership had a straight five-year increase from 2015 
to 2019.  
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Railroad passenger transportation plays a critical role in the U.S. economy by promoting 
economic activities in regions, especially between big cities. For example, more than two-thirds 
of the trip occurs between Boston-New York-Washington D.C., the most important political and 
economic regions in the U.S. (Morrison 1990). Additionally, the Amtrak enterprise employs 
more than 20,000 workers, with additional jobs are being created as railroads develop and 
expand (Amtrak 2018). Depending on the GAAP (Generally Accepted Accounting Principles), 
Amtrak generated $3.4 billion in revenue in the fiscal year 2018, an increase of 4.5 percent over 
the fiscal year 2016 (Amtrak 2018). Figure 1.2 shows the revenue of Amtrak in the last five 
years. In 2012, the federal government invested $1.42 billion dollars on Amtrak (Peterman 
2017), representing 0.4 percent of all federal nondefense investments. In short, the Amtrak 
railroad is vital for public services, economic development, and government operations. 
Amtrak, as a railroad covering the entire United States, is vulnerable to natural and human-
caused hazards. For example, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina caused the failure of the Amtrak 
railroad in New Orleans. Important Amtrak operations through New Orleans were forced to stop, 
such as the operation of routes from New Orleans to Chicago, from New Orleans to New York, 
and from Orlando to Los Angeles. These nationwide operations were recovered after completing 
repairs to rails, bridges, and other infrastructures necessary for travel (DesRoches 2006). In 
addition, over 60 railroad failures happened in the Seattle-Vancouver’s Amtrak operation 
between 2009 and 2013. The Amtrak operation from the northwestern United States to Canada 
was canceled or delayed more than 15 times a year (Azad et al. 2016). Amtrak disruptions cost 




Figure 1.1 The Amtrak ridership from 2015 to 2019. 
 
 
Figure 1.2 The Amtrak revenue from 2015 to 2019. 
 
1.2.2 Freight Railroads: Class I 
The entire freight railroad system in the U.S. consists of 136,898 rail miles, including more than 
500 local railroads and 21 regional railroads. The freight railroad can be divided into three 
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categories as Class I, II, and III, depending on the annual gross revenue of the entity to which the 
freight railroads belong. In 1991, the Surface Transportation Board (STB) described the Class I 
railroad as "having the annual carrier operating revenue of $250 million or more in 1991 
dollars." However, STB published in 2011 (Federal Register 2011) the annual inflation-adjusted 
index factors to update the annual gross revenue for classification resulting in increasing the 
$250 million threshold to $467.1 million by 2013 (Lawrence 2015). Currently, seven railroad 
entities in the U.S. are designated as Class I: (1) CSX Transportation, (2) Grand Trunk 
Corporation (held by Canadian National Railroad), (3) Kansas City Southern Railroad, (4) 
Norfolk Southern Railroad, (5) BNSF Railroad, (6) Soo Line Railroad (held by Canadian Pacific 
Railroad), and (7) Union Pacific Railroad. Figure 1.3 shows the annual revenue of Class I 
railroads. The entire industry created over $90 billion in revenue in the fiscal year 2018, which is 
close to 30 times that of the Amtrak railroad. 
 
 
Figure 1.3 The annual revenue of Class I freight railroads from 2014 to 2018. 
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The significance of the Class I railroad is not only reflected by its revenue but more importantly, 
it is the primary transportation mode for freights. Five principal modes are used to transport 
freights in the United States: Class I railroads, trucking, pipelines, waterways, and airfreight. 
According to the National Rail Plan Progress Report (Federal Railroad Administration 2010), in 
2010, Class I railroads carried nearly 40 percent of the United States freight by ton-miles. Figure 
1.4 shows that Class I railroads can be considered the most crucial transportation mode. Class I 
railroads transport some of the most needed daily commodities, and the necessities of industrial 
manufacturing. For example, in 2019, U.S. Class I railroads moved 1.6 million carloads of 
agricultural and food products, 4 million carloads of coal and 2.4 million carloads of chemicals 
(Association of American Railroads 2019).  
 
 
Figure 1.4 Percent ton-miles of each transportation mode in 2010. 
Data Resource: National Rail Plan Progress Report (Federal Railroad Administration 2010). 
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The Class I railroad contributes the majority of the total railroad revenue and is one of the most 
critical transportation modes, with great economic and fiscal impacts on the United States. In the 
fiscal year 2017, Class I railroads generated almost $26 billion in tax (Irani et al. 2018). 
According to a report from Towson University (Irani et al. 2018), the economic impact can be 
measured in three types:  
• The direct economic impact of generated jobs. In 2017, Class I railroad employed 90 
percent of 1.1 million U.S. railroad workers and supported $71 billion in wages 
(Association of American Railroads 2017); 
• The indirect economic impact of generated production and related services that can be 
purchased from other companies; 
• The increased employment and increased income levels for households, which results in 
an increase in household purchases from local businesses. 
 
Class I railroads, as a complex railroad system covering the entire United States, are also 
vulnerable to natural and human-caused hazards. In addition to the damage to Amtrak’s rails in 
New Orleans, Hurricane Katrina in 2015 also caused the failure of Class I railroads. As a 
consequence, the Norfolk Southern railroad operations from Slidell, Louisiana to Shrewsbury, 
Massachusetts, from New Orleans to the Port Nickel and other Norfolk Southern railroad 
operations connected to New Orleans were forced to stop and switch to other railroads 
(DesRoches 2006). Class I railroad operations in the entire eastern region were greatly affected 
and delayed. The flooding of the Mississippi and Missouri rivers in 1993 caused Class I railroads 
to fail. The estimated losses of Class I freight railroad due to this flooding were more than $182 
million (estimated values in 2014) (Gedik et al. 2014).  
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1.3 Railroad Systems and Rail Networks 
1.3.1 Railroad Systems 
Every component of railroads can be affected by natural and human-caused hazards (Batarlienė 
2008). Therefore, the composition of the entire railroad must be understood first. A system can 
be described as an interdependent group of components building a unified whole (Ayyub 2014). 
The main components of a railroad system are trains, entities, infrastructures, users and 
environment. The most basic level of the railroad system is the trains, which are a set of wheeled 
vehicles moving along the rail. The powered vehicle that pulls the train is called a locomotive. 
And other wheeled vehicles used for the hauling of freight or passengers are called railroad cars. 
The entire railroad is owned, operated, and maintained by entities. Therefore, the railroad entity 
is also an important part of a railroad system. The most important component in a railroad 
system is infrastructure. Infrastructures in a railroad consist of rails, stations, train inspection, 
signaling, and electrification equipment. The users of the railroad mainly include passengers and 
producers, such as agricultural and food, coal, construction-related, and chemical producers. 
Finally, the environment where a railroad is located is composed of topography, geological 
conditions, climate, and weather. The work breakdown structure of a typical railroad system is 




Figure 1.5 Work breakdown structure of a railroad system. 
 
1.3.2 Rail Networks 
The failure of rails and stations is a central and serious situation for a railroad system leading to 
disruptions. For example, the 2005 Hurricane Katrina destroyed most of Class I and Amtrak rails 
in New Orleans as well as the New Orleans Station. As a consequence, almost all railroad 
operations connected to New Orleans in the southeast U.S. were forced to stop for one week and 
were fully recovered after all damaged rails and stations were repaired (DesRoches 2006). In 
order to focus on the disruptions of rails and stations, the notion of a rail network is introduced.  
 
A network includes two basic components: vertices or nodes, and the connections between them, 
called edges or links. Figure 1.6 shows a simple network in which red dots represent nodes, and 
black lines represent links. Most networks are defined and mapped from physical connections 
between a set of items (Barabási and Pósfai 2016). For instance, the nervous system in 
mammalian brains, consisting of more than 100 billion neurons, is modeled by scientists as a 
complex network. The cell called neuron is modeled as nodes, such as red dots in Figure 1.6, 
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while the axon connecting neighboring cells are modeled as links, such as black lines in Figure 
1.6 (Barabási and Pósfai 2016). 
 
 
Figure 1.6 Graph of a network. 
 
A transportation network, especially the rail network, is a real-life example of complex networks. 
Stations are infrastructures where passengers board or alight from trains, and freights can be 
loaded or unloaded. Stations can be directly mapped as nodes, such as the red dots in Figure 1.6. 
Rails that physically connect stations, including two parallel bars of rolled steel, to form the 
whole rail network can be mapped as links, such as the black lines in Figure 1.6. Although the 
rail network can be highly complex, the arrangement of nodes and links and connectivity 




1.4 Needs in Studying Rail Networks 
In rail networks, any rail or station failure due to natural and human-caused hazards would lead 
to serious consequence, such as the performance loss of the entire or a portion of the rail 
network, which means that rail networks are vulnerable to disruptions of rails and stations. This 
network vulnerability is defined as the degree of susceptibility of a network due to the 
connectivity changes between nodes and links (Saadat et al. 2019). Higher network vulnerability 
means more susceptibility to disruptions. Therefore, connectivity and vulnerability of rail 
networks need to be analyzed and assessed to evaluate the consequence of disruptions in a risk 
analysis framework for managing risk and resilience. Resilience refers to the ability to prepare 
for and adapt to changing conditions, withstand hazards, and recover from disruptions (The 
White House Office of the Press Secretary 2013; Ayyub 2014). The resilience of rail networks 
also needs to be assessed and further strengthened to reduce the impact of disruptions on rails 
and stations. The following research needs of rail networks are summarized:  
1. Modeling and analyzing the connectivity among stations by rails in order to assess the 
rail network vulnerability. 
2. Assessing the rail network vulnerability due to the failure of rails and stations. 
3. Assessing the rail network resilience in order to measure the ability of networks to 
prepare for and adapter to changing conditions, withstand hazards, and recover from 
disruptions of rails and stations; and  
4. Enhancing rail networks and determining strategies for recovery based on network 
vulnerability and resilience assessment. 
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1.5 Organization of Thesis 
Chapter 1 serves as an introduction of this thesis, including the significance and criticality of 
railroads, a definition of railroad systems and rail networks, the need to study rail networks, and 
an outline of the organization of each chapter.  
 
Chapter 2 is the literature review of rail network topology, vulnerability and resilience. After 
which, the existing research on topology enhancement and recovery strategies are summarized. 
Based on the literature review, gaps are identified, and objectives are proposed in Chapter 2. 
 
Chapter 3 presents theories and processes with illustrative examples of a methodology to analyze 
the rail network topology, assess and reduce the vulnerability and strengthen the resilience.  
 
Chapter 4 shows how the methodology can be applied to specific case studies, such as Amtrak 
and Class I rail networks.  
 
Chapter 5 provides a summary, conclusions and contributions from this thesis. Additionally, this 













Chapter 2: Topological Analytics of Rail Networks: A Literature 
Review 
2.1 Rail Network Topology 
Network connectivity among stations by rails can be quantified by analyzing network topology. 
The network topology analysis starts by mapping a rail network in the form of a graph. Garrison 
and Marble (1962) first proposed how to graph the components of rail networks, such as nodes 
and links. Additionally, they defined the connection matrix, structural patterns, and the 
cyclomatic number to demonstrate the network topology mathematically. Musso and Vuchic 
(1988) defined indicators used to analyze the rail network topology, such as path length and 
network density. They also analyzed the passenger flow and the population expression of metro 
rail networks. The network topology was assumed to be either completely random or completely 
regular. Watts and Strogatz (1998) first proposed the "small-world" characteristics of network 
topology. The “small-world” network is highly clustered with relatively small characteristic path 
lengths due to the presence of long-range links. Barabási and Albert (1999) proposed another 
important characteristic of network topology called “scale-free”. The probability 𝑝(𝑘) that the 
node in a complex network connects with k other nodes is supposed to decay as a power law, 
which means the degree of network connectivity decreases as the number of nodes increases. 
Latora and Marchiori (2002) first proved that the topology of the Boston metro rail network had 
the “small-world” characteristic. Derrible and Kennedy (2010) proved that most metro rail 
networks are either scale-free or small-world networks. Braha (2017) summarized characteristics 
and indicators of network topology.  
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Measuring and analyzing network topology are based on the calculation of topology indicators. 
However, as the number of nodes and links of networks increases, the size of matrices and the 
number of iterations in the topology indicator calculations can become extremely large. For 
example, the real Class I freight rail network contains more than 40,000 nodes and links, which 
means that in the calculation of topology indicators, the number of rows and columns of matrices 
exceeds 40,000. Using these matrices to perform over 40,000 iterative calculations is extremely 
difficult and inefficient. Therefore, the current analysis of rail network topology has a limitation 
based on its use for analyzing metro rail networks with 100 to 350 nodes and associated links 
(Derrible and Kennedy 2010; Zhang et al. 2018; Saadat et al. 2019). 
 
2.2 Rail Network Vulnerability 
From network topological perspectives, Latora and Marchiori (2001) first defined a performance 
indicator, called network efficiency, for the Boston metro rail network. Derrible and Kennedy 
(2010) further investigated the efficiency of 33 metro rail networks in the world. Based on the 
network efficiency, the assessment of node and link vulnerability mainly follows the approach of 
complete enumeration to measure the loss of network efficiency due to the disruption of nodes 
and links (i.e. rails and stations) (Saadat et al. 2019; Bešinović 2020). Network vulnerability is 
the maximum value of node and link vulnerability (Zhang et al. 2011). Chang et al. (2006) 
calculated the efficiency of metro rail networks in Seoul, Tokyo, Boston, and Beijing. 
Additionally, Zhang et al. (2018) and Saadat et al. (2019) assessed the vulnerability of the 
Shanghai and Washington D.C. metro rail networks respectively. 
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The same limitation of network topology analysis also exists in the network vulnerability 
assessment. As the number of nodes and links of networks increases, the size of matrices and the 
number of iterations in the network efficiency and vulnerability calculations become large. 
Therefore, the network efficiency and vulnerability assessment focused on metro rail networks 
with a limited number of nodes and links, such as for metro networks (Derrible and Kennedy 
2010; Zhang et al. 2018;). 
 
2.3 Rail Network Resilience 
The increasing number of disruptions caused by natural and human-caused hazards seriously 
affects the performance of rail networks (Bešinović 2020). Resilience refers to the ability to 
prepare for and adapt to changing conditions, withstand hazards, and recover from disruptions 
(The White House Office of the Press Secretary 2013; Ayyub 2014). Therefore, the demand for 
assessing and enhancing network resilience has greatly increased in order to manage risks to the 
performance of rail networks. Two primary methods of assessing the rail network resilience are 
the data-driven method and the topological method (Bešinović 2020). 
 
2.3.1 Data-driven Methods 
Data-driven methods rely on the recorded historical data, such as ridership, the time of arrival, 
and the number of kilometers traveled by trains, to develop statistical models which can reflect 
the change of rail network performances when different events occur. Network resilience can be 
further assessed based on the statistical model. Additionally, data-driven methods are mostly 
used to assess the resilience of rail networks affected by disruptive events due to natural hazards. 
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Janić (2018) defined social-economic related performance indicators and developed statistical 
models to assess the resilience of Japan’s Shinkansen Rail network affected by the 2011 Tohoku 
Earthquake. Zhu et al. (2017) used the data-driven method to analyze the impact of storm surge 
caused by Hurricane Irene and Sandy on the New York City rail network and to assess the 
network resilience based on individual ridership data. Dawson et al. (2016) assessed the impact 
of sea-level rise on the England coastal rail network and to assess the network resilience in the 
event that the worst sea-level rise occurs. Other researchers use data-driven methods to assess the 
resilience of passenger or freight rail networks affected by different types of natural hazards, 
such as heat waves (Ferranti et al. 2016), snow and rainfalls (Chan and Schofer 2016). 
 
2.3.2 Topological Methods 
From network topological perspectives, the network resilience can be assessed based on 
topological performance indicators rather than the recorded historical data of rail networks. 
Adjetey-Bahun et al. (2016) proposed time-varying graphs and integrated operating conditions 
into topological performance indicators to assess rail network resilience. Additionally, they 
performed a case study of the Paris rail network, showing that some components of the Paris rail 
network are not related to topological performance indicators. However, when integrating 
operating conditions, these components become relevant to topological performance indicators. 
Chen and Miller-Hooks (2012) used a stochastic mixed-integer program to quantify network 
resilience based on topological indicators and also proved the significance of recovery strategies 
on the ability of networks to recover from disruptions. Saadat et al. (2020) used the resilience 
triangle proposed by Bruneau et al (2003) to demonstrate the loss and recovery of network 
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efficiency and to further assess the time-dependent network resilience. They also determined the 
best recovery sequence with respect to the value of a resilience index.  
 
 2.4 Topology Enhancement and Recovery Strategies 
2.4.1 Topology Enhancement  
From network topological perspectives, the network vulnerability assessment allows us to 
evaluate the impact of disruptions of nodes and links on rail networks (i.e. the loss of network 
efficiency), while network resilience can also be assessed based on topological performance 
indicators. After which, strategies to reduce the impact of disruptions by reducing the network 
vulnerability and strengthening network resilience can be determined.  
 
Saadat et al. (2020) proposed a pre-failure strategy called topology enhancement to reduce the 
network vulnerability by adding additional links into rail networks. They added three 
hypothetical loop lines consisting of several links into the Washington D.C. metro rail network, 
creating topological redundancy and reducing network vulnerability. With topological 
redundancy, when nodes or links fail, other alternative nodes or links can be used to reduce the 
loss of network efficiency. Therefore, the network vulnerability can be further reduced. It should 
be mentioned that adding hypothetical loop lines is only used to enhance the network at the 
theoretical level from the topological perspectives. Designing and adding loop lines into a real 
rail network will have many limitations because of the actual situations and policy restrictions. 
However, the results in this thesis can provide additional insights to decision-makers in 
managing risks. 
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The topology enhancement method first proposed by Saadat et al. (2020) was only researched on 
the Washington D.C. metro rail network. Additionally, the Washington D.C. metro only has 91 
nodes and 140 links, which means adding few links can create enough redundancy and reduce 
the network vulnerability effectively. This topology enhancement strategy needs to be verified in 
rail networks with more nodes and links than the Washington D.C. metro rail network. 
 
2.4.2 Recovery Strategies 
A recovery strategy focuses on strengthening the rail network resilience through identifying the 
best recovery sequence after the disruption of nodes and links (i.e. rails and stations). Henry and 
Ramirez-Marquez (2012) proposed five time-related transition states of network resilience and 
further measured the network resilience as a function of time. They used a road network as a case 
study, proving that designing a good recovery sequence is an effective way to increase the 
network resilience. Zhang et al. (2018) measured the network resilience using the resilience 
triangle proposed by Bruneau et al (2003). They assumed that only one component of rail 
networks can be repaired in a recovery stage and determined the best sequential recovery 
strategy for Shanghai metro network. Saadat et al. (2020) determined recovery strategies for four 
different hypothetical disruption cases in Washington D.C. metro: (1) one transfer station and its 
connected rails; (2) multiple stations with different node degrees; (3) multiple stations with the 
same node degrees; and (4) multiple rails.  
 
When station disruptions caused by natural or human-made hazards occur, the entrances and 
exits must be closed, and these disrupted stations cannot be used as departure or destination 
stations before they are repaired (Yin et al. 2018). Therefore, the repair of disrupted stations is 
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important for the recovery strategy. However, for the disruption case of one transfer station and 
its connected rails, the recovery strategy only considers the repair of rails (Zhang et al. 2018; 
Saadat et al. 2020), while the repair of the station itself is ignored in the recovery sequence.  
 
2.5 Gaps and Objectives 
The literature review highlights the significance and needs in studying rail networks. On this 
basis, the following gap from the literature review helps to focus the objectives of this thesis:  
• The network topology analysis is an effective tool to graph and analyze the arrangement 
and connectivity between nodes and links. However, as the number of nodes and links 
increases, the network topology analysis can become overly complicated. Therefore, how 
to graph and analyze the topology of more complex rail networks accurately and 
effectively requires further research; 
• The vulnerability of metro rail networks can be well reduced through the topology 
enhancement strategy (Saadat et al. 2020). However, as the network connectivity 
becomes more complex and developed, adding a small number of links is difficult to 
reduce the network vulnerability effectively. Whether the same topology enhancement 
strategy is applicable to rail networks with more complex connectivity than metro rail 
networks requires further research; and  
• For the disruption case of one transfer station and its connected rails, the repair of stations 
needs to be considered in the sequential recovery strategy.  
 
Based on the literature review and gaps, the main objectives of this research are to: 
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1. Analyze the topology of rail networks containing more nodes and links than metro rail 
networks accurately and effectively; 
2. From network topological perspectives, assess the rail network vulnerability and 
resilience; and 
3. Determine the topology enhancement to reduce the network vulnerability and the 

































Chapter 3: Methodology and Illustrative Examples 
Using complex network theory, a network is treated mathematically and represented by a graph 
with two components: nodes and links for the connectivity among nodes and links. Based on the 
complex network theory, a methodology is proposed to analyze rail networks and to reduce the 
impact of potential failures by examining: (1) network topology; (2) network efficiency and 
vulnerability; (3) network resilience; and (4) the impact of potential failures. The methodology as 
shown in Figure 3.1 consists of the following steps: 
1. Defining nodes, links, and the connectivity pattern of rail networks, then, mapping rail 
networks in the form of a graph; 
2. Analyzing network topology by calculating topological indicators;  
3. Measuring network efficiency and further network vulnerability from network 
topological perspectives;  
4. Identifying the characteristics of vulnerable nodes and links, and the critical areas of 
networks; 
5. Evaluating the network resilience index based on the changes of topological performance 
indicators (i.e., network efficiency); and 
6. Enhancing the network topology by adding loop lines and determining the best sequential 
recovery strategy based on resilience assessments.  
 
Bollobás (1985) and West (1995) provides background information on complex network theory. 
Boccaletti et al. (2006) and Braha (2017) summarized methods on measuring the topological 
indicators and characteristics of general complex networks. Derrible and Kennedy (2010), Zhang 
et al. (2018), and Saadat et al. (2019) used the complex network theory to represent metro rail 
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networks as a graph and analyzed the rail network topology. Latora and Marchiori (2002) 
initially defined the network efficiency for the Boston metro rail network, which provided a basis 
to quantify the robustness and vulnerability (Zhang et al. 2018) of rail networks subjected to 
potential failures and attacks. Later, Saadat et al. (2020) proposed the topology enhancement 
strategy to reduce network vulnerability. Based on the resilience triangle proposed by Bruneau et 
al (2003), Zhang et al. (2018) and Saadat et al. (2020) provides methods on assessing the 
network resilience dynamically from the topological perspectives and determining the sequential 
recovery strategy regarding resilience restoration. 
 
 
Figure 3. 1 Proposed methodology for analyzing rail networks and mitigating the impact of 
disruptions. 
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3.1 Analyzing Network Topology  
Network topology is defined as the arrangement and connectivity among the components of a 
network. The analysis of rail network topology starts with defining and mapping stations and 
rails to nodes and links, respectively, in the form of a graph. Afterward, the topological 
indicators of rail networks are calculated to analyze network, which helps to quantify the 
connectivity of complex rail networks. Combined with an illustrative example, the analysis of 
network topology is introduced in detail in this section. 
 
3.1.1 Defining and Mapping Network  
In mapping rail networks as the form of a graph, the stations of a rail network can be mapped as 
nodes, such as the red dots in Figure 1.6, while links represent the rails of a rail network, such as 
the black lines in Figure 1.6. After numbering each node and link, the topology vector 𝐺 is 
specified as Equation (3.1):  
 
 𝐺 = {𝑆, 𝐸} (3.1) 
 
where, 
G: the topology vector of a network 
S: the collection of all nodes  
E: the collection of all links 
 
For example, the topology vector 𝐺 of the network as shown in Figure 1.6 is:  
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 𝐺 = {6,7} (3.2) 
 
Then, si denotes each node in the set S. For the network as shown in Figure 1.6: 
 
 𝑆 = {𝑠𝑖|𝑖 = 1,2,3,4,5,6} (3.3) 
Also, eij in the set E represents a link that connects node i and node j. Referring to the network as 
shown in Figure 1.6:  
 
 𝐸 = {𝑒𝑖𝑗|𝑖, 𝑗 = 1,2,3,4,5,6} (3.4) 
 
Each link 𝑒𝑖𝑗 can also be represented as (𝑖, 𝑗). Also, for an undirected network, the link from 
node i to node j is the same as the link from node j to node i.  
 
3.1.2 Calculating Topological Indicators 
A network’s connectivity can be expressed mathematically by a 𝑛 × 𝑛 symmetric adjacency 
matrix, where n is the number of nodes in a network. Elements in the adjacency matrix are 
denoted as 𝑎𝑖𝑗:  
 
 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
1     𝑖𝑓 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑗,
0     𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒.                                        
 (3.5) 
 
Three types of networks can affect the value of elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 in the adjacency matrix. First, 
networks can be distinguished into weighted and unweighted. In a weighted network, some links 
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are more important or stronger than other links. Therefore, 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is not always equal to 0 or 1 but 




Figure 3. 2 Weighted and unweighted networks: (a) weighted; (b) unweighted. 
 
For example, in the weighted network as shown in Figure 3.2 (a), dash lines indicate less 
important or weaker links, while the solid line indicates more important or stronger links. All 
links are considered equally important or strong in the unweighted network as shown in Figure 
3.2 (b). As a result, the adjacency matrix for weighted and unweighted networks in Figure 3.2 
can be represented as: 
 














x: the value of 𝑎𝑖𝑗 of less important or weaker links; 0 < 𝑥 < 1 
 
The second type of network is the directed and undirected network. A directed graph is called 
digraph in which the link pointing from node i to node j is in a particular direction. For a directed 
link eij, the value of 𝑎𝑖𝑗
 in the adjacency matrix is not equal to the value of 𝑎𝑗𝑖
. Therefore, the 




Figure 3. 3 Directed and undirected networks: (a) directed; (b) undirected. 
 
The adjacency matrix for directed and undirected networks in Figure 3.3 can be represented as: 
 













Also, networks can have multiple links among node i to node j. Additionally, a self-edge means 
that a link connects a node to itself. For the node i with a self-edge, the value of 𝑎𝑖𝑖 is equal to 2. 
Figure 3.4 shows a multi-edges network: 
 
 
Figure 3. 4 Multi-edges network. 
 
The adjacency matrix for the multi-edges network as shown in Figure 3.4 is specified as: 
 






In the network studied in this thesis, every link among each pair of nodes is undirected and 
unweighted. Additionally, multiple links and the self-edge are not considered. The adjacency 
matrix is the most critical mathematic expression of graphing a network. All the calculations of 
topological indicators are based on the adjacency matrix. A comprehensive definition of the 
adjacency matrix for rail networks was proposed by Zhang et al. (2018), which applies in both 
simple and non-simple (i.e., weighted, directed, and multi-edges) networks. For the adjacency 
matrix defined by Zhang et al. (2018), if node i and j are connected, the value of 𝑎𝑖𝑗 equals to 
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one. If node i and j are not connected, the value of 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is equal to infinity. Otherwise, the value of 
𝑎𝑖𝑗 equals to zero for the self-edge. Hence, for the illustrative example in Figure 1.6, a 6 × 6 
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Node degree is a topological indicator that can be used to demonstrate the centrality of networks. 
The node degree of node i is equal to the number of links connected to it. Based on the adjacency 
matrix, the node degree denoted as 𝐾𝑖 can be calculated as follows:  
 
 𝐾𝑖 = ∑𝑎𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1
 (𝑎𝑖𝑗 ≠ ∞) (3.12) 
 
where, 
n: the number of nodes  
 
When using Equation (3.12) to calculate the node degree, infinity elements 𝑎𝑖𝑗 in the adjacency 
matrix Equation (3.11) need to be eliminated first. Table 3.1 shows the node degree of the 




Table 3. 1 Node degree of the network as shown in Figure 1.6. 
 
 
The average node degree denoted as 𝐾 can be calculated by Equation (3.13). The average node 










In order to describe the process of moving from one node to another node in rail networks,  
a path is defined as a node sequence that each consecutive pair of nodes in the path is connected 
by links. In an unweighted rail network, the path length is the number of links between all 
consecutive pairs of nodes. Another critical network topological indicator is the minimum 
number of links moving from node i to node j, called the shortest path length or geodesic path 
length 𝑑𝑖𝑗. For instance, the shortest path from node 1 to node 6 of the network as shown in 
Figure 1.6 is 𝑠1𝑠2𝑠4𝑠6, and the shortest path length is equal to 3.  
 
In a complex network, finding the shortest path length between each pair of nodes is a 
challenging problem. Several shortest path algorithms have been formulated to solve this 









(SPFA) based on the Breadth-first search, is a refinement of the Bellman-Ford Algorithm. The 
main philosophy of this algorithm is to start the procedure with “root nodes,” then to improve the 
shortest path by examining all paths from this “root node” to its neighbors (Ding 1994). The 
neighbor of a node i are defined as the nodes that directly connect to node i by links. The 
procedure of Shortest Path Faster Algorithm is laid out as follows in Step1 through Step3:  
1. Given a network 𝐺 = {𝑛, 𝑒}. Defining a subset of “root nodes” r (𝑟 = {1,2,3…𝑛}). Set all 
the distance of root node as zeros (i.e. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑟) = 0), while set all the distance of non-root 
node i as infinity (i.e. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑖) = 𝑖𝑛𝑓). Continue Step 2; 
2. Among the “root node” subset, set a “root node” i as an “initial node.” Then, select a 
neighbor j of node i as the “marked” node. If no node is marked, the algorithm ends, 
otherwise, continue to Step 3; and  
3. For each length of links between node i and node j denoted as 𝐿(𝑖, 𝑗), compare the 
distance 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑗) with the sum of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑖) and 𝐿(𝑖, 𝑗). Whenever the sum is less than the 
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑗), update 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑗) equals to the sum of 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑖) and 𝐿(𝑖, 𝑗). Also, set the node j as 
the next “initial node”. After all neighbors of initial node i have been analyzed, back to 
Step 2.  
 
For example, in the unweighted network as shown in Figure 1.6 (i.e. the length of all links equal 
to 1), node 1 is set as root node and the first “initial node.” Therefore, 
 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑖) = {
0                𝑖 = 1




Node 2 is one of node 1’s neighbors. Node 2 is the “marked” node that the distance 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(2) is 
equal to infinity in this stage. Therefore:  
 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(2) < 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(1) + 𝐿(1,2) = 1 (3.15) 
 
The distance of node 2 is updated to one and set as the next “initial node.” By repeating the 
procedure of Shortest Path Faster Algorithm, the following results can be obtained:  
 
Table 3. 2 The shortest path length between node 1 and others. 
 
 
where 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡(𝑖) is the shortest path length 𝑑1𝑖 from node 1 to node i. The shortest path length 
between any pair of nodes can be obtained by changing the root node, which can be further used 
to calculate the diameter of a network denoted as D. The concept of network diameter is defined 
as the maximum value of shortest path lengths between all pairs of nodes.  
 










For the network as shown in Figure 1.6, the network diameter is equal to 3. Additionally, average 














6 × (6 − 1)
× 50 = 1.67 (3.18) 
 
Another topological indicator, called network density denoted as 𝜌 is the fraction of the number 








E: the number of links  
𝐸𝑚𝑎𝑥: all possible number of links that can be calculated by Equation (3.20):  
 






Using Equation (3.19) and Equation (3.20), the density of the network as shown in Figure 1.6 













= 0.33 (3.21) 
 
Characteristic path length L is a topological indicator measuring the separation degree of nodes 
in networks, whereas the clustering coefficient C is an indicator representing the aggregation 
degree of nodes in network. The clustering coefficient can be divided into two levels: local and 
global. The global clustering coefficient denoted as 𝐶𝐺  is used to measure the degree of node 
aggregation among the overall network, which can be calculated by the ratio of the number of 
closed triplets to the number of all closed and open triplets (Prokhorenkova et al. 2015). A closed 
triplet is a set of three nodes that any pair of nodes are connected with, whereas an open triplet 
means three nodes are connected only by two links. For instance, zero closed triplets and 18 open 
triplets are in the network as shown in Figure 1.6. Therefore, the global clustering coefficient is 
zero.  
 
The local clustering coefficient 𝐶𝑖 of node i can be measured by the ratio of the number of links 
between its neighbors to the number of all possible links between its neighbors. For a node i with 
𝐾𝑖 node degree, the number of all possible links between its neighbors is given as a binomial 
coefficient (𝐾𝑖
2
). Besides, denoting 𝑒𝑛𝑖 as the real number of links between the neighbors of node 






























Using Equation (3.23) to calculate the average local clustering coefficient of the network as 





× (0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 + 0) = 0 (3.24) 
 
3.2 Assessing Network Efficiency and Vulnerability 
The network efficiency used to measure the efficiency of information exchange within a network 
was initially introduced by Latora and Marchiori (2001). The efficiency between node i and node 
j is inverse proportional to the shortest path length 𝑑𝑖𝑗, i.e., the smaller the shortest path length 
from node i to node j, the more efficient information exchange between them. Therefore, the 















6 × (6 − 1)
× 21.33 = 0.711 (3.26) 
 
The potential failures of nodes and links might cause part of networks disrupted, affecting the 
shortest path length between each pair of nodes and further affecting the network efficiency. The 
vulnerability of nodes and links can be defined as the degree of the network efficiency loss after 









𝐸𝐺: initial network efficiency 
𝐸𝐺𝑖 : network efficiency after removing a node or link 
𝑉𝑖: the vulnerability of one network component 
 
The vulnerability of a network is the maximum value of node and link vulnerability as follows: 
 




𝑉: network vulnerability 
 




Figure 3. 5 Network graph after node 4 disrupted. 
 
The network efficiency 𝐸𝐺𝑖  can be obtained using Equation (3.25), and the vulnerability of node 










5 × (5 − 1)









= 0.1 (3.30) 
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3.3 Identifying Critical Components and Areas 
Following the approach of complete enumeration, the network vulnerability due to the failure of 
each component in a rail network can be measured. Then, the critical components of a network 
are those nodes or links whose failures lead to relatively high network vulnerability. 
Additionally, for rail networks covering a wide area and containing a large number of nodes and 
links, such as the Amtrak and Class I rail networks, some critical components will be 
concentrated in specific areas. The arrangement of critical components can be displayed on 
maps. Then, the critical area where critical components are concentrated can be identified. 
Enhancing network topology and resilience in the critical area provides a basis to reduce the 
impacts of potential failures.  
 
3.4 Evaluating Resilience Index 
Network resilience can be quantified and assessed by using the resilience triangle (Bruneau et al 
2003) as shown in Figure 3.6 to calculate the resilience index. In the resilience triangle, the 
network performance changes over time, including the performance loss stage at time t0 and the 











𝑅𝑒: resilience index 
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𝑡0: the time when performance loses 
𝑡ℎ: the period when the network performance recovers to the initial condition 
𝑄(𝑡): time-dependent network performance function 
𝑄𝑜: initial network performance 
 
The resilience index of rail networks can be calculated based on the change of topological 
performance indicators, such as network efficiency 𝐸𝐺 . For example, if the disruptions of link e12 
and e34 of the network in Figure 1.6 occur and the recovery sequence is e12-e34 (i.e., repair link 
e12 first, then repair link e34), the resilience triangle is shown in Figure 3.7, where link e12 and e34 
disrupt at the recovery stage 1, then, link e12 is repaired at recovery stage 2 and link e34 is 










= 0.923 (3.32) 
 
where, 
𝐸𝐺(𝑡): time-dependent network efficiency function 




Figure 3. 6 Resilience Triangle. 
 
 
Figure 3. 7 Resilience triangle of the recovery sequence e12-e34. 
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3.5 Reducing the Impacts of Potential Failures 
3.5.1 Enhancing Network Topology 
Critical areas in which vulnerable nodes or links concentrate can be identified based on the 
vulnerability assessment of rail networks. Enhancing the network topology of these critical areas 
can significantly reduce the network vulnerability. In this study, the strategy of adding loop lines 
in critical areas is used to reduce the network vulnerability and further reduce the impacts of 
potential failures (Saadat et al. 2020). For example, a hypothetical loop line passing through 
nodes 1, 6, and 3 is added in the network as shown in Figure 1.6, then, a new network is created 
as Figure 3.8. This loop line decreases the characteristic path length of the network, increasing 
network efficiency. Additionally, the loop line creates topological redundancy, meaning when 
any node fails in the network, alternative nodes or links can be used to reduce the loss of network 
efficiency and the vulnerability. Figure 3.9 demonstrates the change of node 4 and network 
vulnerability after adding a hypothetical loop line, indicating that the vulnerability of node 4 and 




Figure 3. 8 Illustrative network after adding a loop line. 
 
 
Figure 3. 9 The change of node 4 and network vulnerability. 
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3.5.2 Sequential Recovery Strategies 
After the disruptions of nodes and links caused by potential failures, different recovery 
sequences lead to different network resilience, which can be measured and compared by the 
value of the resilience index. In order to reduce the impacts of potential failures, the best 
recovery sequence that can result in the largest value of resilience index needs to be determined 
to enhance the network resilience.  
 
For the network as shown in Figure 1.6, after node 4 and its connected links are disrupted, 1 
node and 3 links need to be repaired to recover the network fully. Assuming only one component 
can be repaired in a recovery stage, the number of all possible recovery sequences is equal to 24, 
i.e., the permutation of 4. In this study, the network efficiency is assumed not to be restored by 
the repair of links before the node repair. Because, in reality, sometimes even if rails are 
repaired, the route will not be re-operated until the disrupted station is repaired.  
 
The initial network efficiency is equal to 0.7111, and the network efficiency decreases to 0.6417 
after the disruption of node 4. The resilience index of different recovery sequences can be 
calculated using Equation (3.31). Table 3.3 shows the resilience index values of different 
recovery sequences. Figure 3.10 shows the comparison of recovery triangles. Recovery sequence 
e24- s4- e46- e34 is identified as the optimal one with the largest value of resilience index 0.9234, 
which means if node 4 is disrupted, link e24 should be repaired first, then node 4, followed by 








Figure 3. 10 (a) Node 4 repaired in the first order; (b) Node 4 repaired in the second order; (c) 
Node 4 repaired in the third order; (d) Node 4 repaired in the fourth order. 
Ranking Recovery sequence Re
1 e24 - s4 - e46 - e34 0.9234
2 e24 - s4 - e34 - e46 0.9175
3 s 4  repaired in the third order 0.9146
4 s 4 - e34 - e24 - e46 0.9048
5 s 4  repaired in the fourth order 0.9024
6 s 4 - e24 - e46 - e34 0.9017
7 s 4 - e24 - e34 - e46 0.8958
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Chapter 4 Case Studies: Amtrak and Class I Rail Networks 
Two critical rail networks in the United States are modeled and analyzed in this chapter. The first 
network is the Amtrak passenger rail network and the second is the Class I freight rail network. 
Both rail networks cover the entire United States, consisting of the greater number of nodes and 
links than metro networks. The methodology proposed in the Chapter 3 is used to analyze the 
topology of Amtrak and Class I rail networks to enhance the network vulnerability and assess the 
recovery strategies for the disruption case of one node and its connected links.  
 
4.1 Case Study 1: Amtrak Rail Network 
Most of the Amtrak’s rails belong to the Class I railroad entities. The Amtrak rail network can be 
regarded as a subset of Class I rail network for independent research, which serves 529 stations 
and more than 21,400 miles rails in North America, including 46 states, Washington D.C. in the 
United States and three Canadian provinces. Figure 4.1 displays the entire Amtrak rail network 
in North America, where red lines belong to the Amtrak corporation and the yellow lines are 




Figure 4. 1 Map of the Amtrak passenger rail network.  
(Reproduced and edited from Federal Railroad Administration - Safety Map 2020.) 
 
4.1.1 Mapping the Amtrak Rail Network 
The first step of topology analysis is mapping the Amtrak rail network in the form of a graph, 
which can be divided into five areas depending on geographic locations: Northwest (NW), 
Southwest (SW), the Great Lakes area (GL), Southeast (SE), and Northeast (NE). Nodes 
represent the stations of the Amtrak rail network, while links represent the rails that directly 
connect stations. Additionally, the Amtrak rail network is modeled as an unweighted and 
undirected network. At the same time, each node or link is numbered for further analysis. Figure 
4.2 to 4.6 show the graph and numbering of the Amtrak rail network in each area. 
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Figure 4. 2 Northwest area. 
 
 
Figure 4. 3 Southwest area. 
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Figure 4. 4 The Great Lakes area. 
 
 
Figure 4. 5 Southeast area. 
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Figure 4. 6 Northeast area. 
 
In summary, the Amtrak rail network consists of 529 nodes and 552 links. Therefore, the network 
vector is specified as follows: 
 
 𝐺 = [529,552] (4.33) 
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4.1.2 Results and Analysis 
4.1.2.1 Topology Analysis of the Amtrak Rail Network  
The analysis of the Amtrak rail network is based on the adjacency matrix 𝐴𝑖𝑗. According to the 
definition of simple adjacency matrix as used by Zhang et al. (2018): 
 
 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = {
∞     𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ  𝑗.        
1     𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒 𝑖 𝑎𝑟𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑗                 
0     𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓 − 𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒                                                                  
 (4.34) 
 
For the Amtrak rail network, the size of adjacency matrix is 529 × 529. Afterward, topological 
indicators can be measured one by one, including the average node degree 𝐾 (using Equations 
(3.12) and (3.13)), network density 𝜌 (using Equations (3.20) and (3.21)), characteristic path 
length 𝐿 (using the shortest path faster algorithm (SPFA) and Equation (3.18)), diameter of the 
network 𝐷 (using Equation (3.17)), local clustering coefficient ?̅? (using Equations (3.23) and 
(3.24)), and global network efficiency 𝐸𝐺  (using Equation (3.26)). Table 4.1 summarizes the 
results of the Amtrak rail network's topological indicators: 
 
Table 4. 1 Topological indicators of the Amtrak rail network. 
 
No. Topological Indicators Values Notes
1 Average node degree 2.087 /
2 Network density 0.004 /
3 Characteristic path length 35.404 /
4 Diameter of the network 91 /
5 Local clustering coefficient 0.0124 Ignore nodes with node degree 1
6 Global network efficiency 0.0463 /
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4.1.2.2 Vulnerability Assessment of the Amtrak Rail Network 
The vulnerability assessment includes 2 aspects: the network vulnerability due to node and link 
failures, and critical area identification. The network vulnerability due to the failure of a node is 
defined as the degree of network efficiency loss after removing this node and its connected links. 
However, when calculating the network vulnerability due to the failure of a link, only this link 
needs to be removed. Therefore, after removing a link, the size of the adjacency matrix remains 
unchanged. Using Equation (3.29) and (3.31), the network vulnerability due to the failure of each 
node and link can be obtained. Table 4.2 shows the top 40 most critical nodes and Table 4.3 
demonstrates the top 40 most critical links. As such, the vulnerability of the Amtrak rail network 













Table 4. 2 Top 40 critical nodes of the Amtrak rail network. 
 
aNW (northwest area), SW (Southwest area), GL (the Great Lakes are), SE (southeast area), and 










No. Name of Station Area
a Node Numbering Node Degree Vulnerability 
1 Chicago (Union Station), Illinois GL 64 7 16.10%
2 Hammond-Whiting, Indiana GL 450 4 12.78%
3 Cleveland, Ohio GL 356 3 7.28%
4 Schenectady, New York NE 372 3 6.04%
5 South Bend, Indiana GL 449 2 5.89%
6 Buffalo (Exchange St),  New York NE 358 3 5.81%
7 Elkhart, Indiana GL 448 2 5.73%
8 Waterloo, Indiana GL 447 2 5.61%
9 Bryan, Ohio GL 446 2 5.53%
10 Elyria, Ohio GL 443 2 5.50%
11 Toledo, Ohio GL 445 2 5.48%
12 Sandusky, Ohio GL 444 2 5.47%
13 Michigan City, Indiana GL 456 2 5.41%
14 Galesburg, Illinois GL 71 4 5.12%
15 Niles, Michigan GL 457 2 4.99%
16 Dowagiac, Michigan GL 458 2 4.61%
17 Erie, Pennsylvania NE 357 2 4.57%
18 Jacksonville, Florida SE 282 3 4.30%
19 Kalamazoo, Michigan GL 459 2 4.26%
20 Glenview, Illinois GL 63 2 4.22%
21 Springfield, Massachusetts NE 388 4 4.17%
22 Battle Creek, Michigan GL 460 3 4.05%
23 Sturtevant, Wisconsin GL 62 2 3.87%
24 Washington, DC NE 323 3 3.77%
25 San Bernardino, California NW 99 4 3.63%
26 Buffalo (Depew), New York NE 366 2 3.61%
27 Milwaukee (General Mitchell Intl Airport), Wisconsin GL 61 2 3.57%
28 New Orleans, Louisiana SE 217 4 3.56%
29 Alexandria, Virginia NE 320 3 3.54%
30 Rochester, New York NE 367 2 3.49%
31 Albany/Rensselaer, New York NE 386 3 3.44%
32 La Grange, Illinois GL 65 2 3.43%
33 Syracuse, New York NE 368 2 3.40%
34 Rome, New York NE 369 2 3.33%
35 Palatka, Florida SE 283 2 3.33%
36 Milwaukee, Wisconsin GL 60 2 3.31%
37 Utica, New York NE 370 2 3.30%
38 Amsterdam, New York NE 371 2 3.30%
39 Naperville, Illinois GL 66 2 3.21%
40 Saratoga Springs, New York NE 373 2 3.16%
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Table 4. 3 Top 40 critical links of the Amtrak rail network. 
 
a NW (northwest area), SW (Southwest area), GL (the Great Lakes are), SE (southeast area), and 
NE (northeast area). 
 
Figure 4.7 shows the arrangement of the top 40 critical nodes, where blue circles indicate the top 
20 critical nodes and green circles represent the remaining top 21-40 critical nodes. In this case, 
the majority of top 40 critical nodes are concentrated in the Great Lakes and the northeast areas. 
No. Starting Node Ending Node Area
a Vulnerability 
1 69 70 GL 7.97%
2 400 401 NE 5.97%
3 388 400 NE 5.80%
4 402 516 NE 5.71%
5 398 399 NE 5.67%
6 397 398 NE 5.58%
7 315 316 NE 5.53%
8 396 397 NE 5.52%
9 394 395 NE 5.50%
10 395 396 NE 5.49%
11 406 407 NE 5.29%
12 407 408 NE 4.90%
13 314 315 NE 4.67%
14 408 409 NE 4.55%
15 316 317 NE 4.53%
16 63 64 GL 4.43%
17 409 410 NE 4.23%
18 62 63 GL 4.08%
19 61 62 GL 3.78%
20 318 319 NE 3.72%
21 238 239 SE 3.64%
22 324 325 NE 3.59%
23 64 65 GL 3.52%
24 60 61 GL 3.51%
25 325 326 NE 3.49%
26 330 437 NE 3.47%
27 326 327 NE 3.42%
28 240 241 SE 3.37%
29 327 328 NE 3.37%
30 329 330 NE 3.35%
31 328 329 NE 3.35%
32 70 71 GL 3.29%
33 59 60 GL 3.27%
34 277 278 SE 3.25%
35 79 80 GL 3.23%
36 312 364 NE 3.15%
37 313 312 NE 3.13%
38 71 72 GL 3.12%
39 241 242 SE 3.12%
40 58 59 GL 3.05%
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For example, 22 nodes are located in the Great Lakes area, accounting for 55 percent, while 14 
nodes are located in the northeast area, accounting for 35 percent. Figure 4.8 demonstrates the 
arrangement of the top 40 critical links, with similar indicators of blue squares for the top 20 
critical links and green squares represent the remaining top 21-40 critical links. The top 40 
critical links are still concentrated in the Great Lakes and northeast areas. All top 20 critical 
links, and 90 percent of top 40 critical links are located in these two areas. As a result, the critical 
areas of the Amtrak rail network are the Great Lakes and northeast areas. Additionally, the 
network vulnerability due to the failure of node 64 (Chicago (Union Station), Illinois) and node 
450 (Hammond-Whiting, Indiana) are much higher than other components of the Amtrak rail 
network. The most critical link is also in the Great Lakes area. Therefore, we will focus on the 
Great Lakes as the most critical area.  
 
 
Figure 4. 7 Arrangement of the Amtrak rail network’s top 40 critical nodes.  




Figure 4. 8 Arrangement of the Amtrak rail network’s top 40 critical links.  
(Reproduced and edited from Federal Railroad Administration - Safety Map 2020.) 
 
The failure of node 64 and node 450 leads to greater network vulnerability than other nodes in 
the Amtrak rail network. The characteristics of these two nodes need to be analyzed with 
emphasis. This thesis will analyze the characteristics of critical nodes from the perspective of the 
area where they are located, the node degree, and the connectivity pattern.  
 
The top 40 critical nodes are mainly concentrated in the Great Lakes and the northeastern area. 
Table 4.4 demonstrates the comparison of the Amtrak network’s five areas. Node density is the 
number of nodes per unit area. Diameter of an area is defined as the maximum value of the 
shortest path length between all pairs of nodes in this area. In this table, the value in each column 
is the ratio between any two areas’ characteristics. The node density of Great Lakes and 
northeast are greater than that of other areas, while the difference of other characteristics 
between the Amtrak network’s five areas are relatively small.  
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Table 4. 4 Comparison of the Amtrak network’s five areas. 
 
 
Node 64 (Chicago (Union Station)) and node 450 (Hammond-Whiting Station) are more critical 
than all other nodes. The most typical feature of these two nodes is that their node degrees are 
relatively large. Figure 4.9 shows the correlation between network vulnerability due to node 
failures and the node degree of failed node. For the top 20 critical nodes, network vulnerability is 
positive linear correlated to the node degree. The correlation continues to decrease as the number 
of critical nodes increases. However, node degree and network vulnerability still maintain a 
positive linear correlation. Thus, it can be determined that the greater the node degree, the greater 
node vulnerability might be. Because, when a node is disrupted, all links connected to it are 
considered disrupted. A node with the higher node degree means that when this node is 
disrupted, more links will also be disrupted, which leads to more severe network efficiency loss.  
 
Area Node Density Average Node Degree Characteristic Path Length Diameter
Northwest 1.00 1.03 1.47 1.38
Southwest 1.99 1.04 1.82 2.00
Great Lakes 5.23 1.00 1.00 1.00
Southeast 2.10 1.04 1.09 1.16
Northeast 6.92 1.05 1.30 1.38
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Figure 4. 9 Correlation between network vulnerability due to node failures and the node degree 
of the failed node. 
 
The measurement of the vulnerability is based on the network efficiency loss that is related to the 
change in network connectivity. A connectivity pattern called the typical connectivity pattern 1 is 
defined and shown as Figure 4.10. In this connectivity pattern, a bridge link 𝑒12 connects two 
transfer nodes: 𝑠1 and 𝑠2, whose node degrees are equal to or more than 3. Also, several branch 
links connect the transfer nodes with their affiliated nodes. For example, the branch links 𝑒13 and 
𝑒14 connect the transfer node 1 with its affiliated nodes 3 and 4. Additionally, a small number of 
intermediate nodes might be on the bridge link.  
 
More than 90 percent of the top 40 critical nodes fall on the typical connectivity pattern 1, 
especially the transfer node and nodes falling on the bridge link. Because if these nodes disrupt, 
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the shortest path length between the nodes on two sides of the bridge link will greatly increase, 
which means the network efficiency will significantly decrease. In the typical connectivity 
pattern 1 of node 64 and 450 shown in Figure 4.11, over ten of the top 40 critical nodes fall on it, 
indicating that nodes on the typical connectivity pattern 1 are likely to produce larger node 
vulnerability than other nodes. In summary, for the typical connectivity pattern in high node 
density areas of the Amtrak rail network, the network vulnerability due to the failure of transfer 
nodes (i.e., large node degree) and nodes on the bridge link might be very large.  
 
 
Figure 4. 10 Typical connectivity pattern 1. 
 
 
Figure 4. 11 The typical connectivity pattern 1 of node 64 and 450.  
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Table 4.3 and Figure 4.8 show the values and arrangement of the top 40 critical links. Compared 
with the node 64 and 450 that are more critical than other nodes, no link is significantly critical 
than other links. The top 40 critical links are still concentrated in the Great Lakes and northeast 
areas. However, in addition to some nodes that are still concentrated around the Chicago Union 
Station, more nodes are concentrated in the northeast corner instead of the area between Chicago 
and New York. 
 
Links with high vulnerability concentrating around the Chicago Union Station and Washington 
D.C. are still in the typical connectivity pattern 1. However, more critical links are concentrated 
on the line that contains the “end-node” (i.e., a node with node degree of 1), for example, the line 
from node 388 to node 399 and node 402 to 411. The explanation of this phenomenon is that 
when a link in the line with “end-node” disrupts, several nodes on this line cannot be reached by 
other nodes in the network. Some shortest path length will be infinity, leading to the network 
efficiency significantly decreasing. For example, if link 𝑒398,399 disrupts, the shortest path length 
between other nodes and node 399 will become infinity. Therefore, the network efficiency will 
be severely lost, which means the vulnerability of link 𝑒398,399 is relatively high.  
 
In summary, critical links of the Amtrak rail network are still concentrated in the areas with high 
node density. Also, most of the top 40 critical links are in the typical connectivity pattern 1 or the 
line with the “end-node.”  
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4.1.2.3 Topology Enhancement of the Amtrak Rail Network 
Depending on the vulnerability assessment, the Great Lakes area is identified as the most critical 
area of the Amtrak rail network. Two hypothetical loop lines are added around the most critical 
node 64 and 450 to create redundancy for the Great Lakes area, enhancing the network topology 
and reducing the vulnerability. In this section, the network vulnerability changes due to the 











) are examined to 
verify if the topology enhancement is applicable to the Amtrak rail network.  
 








, which is the yellow line shown in 






, again shown as the yellow line in Figure 4.12 (b).  
 
 
Figure 4. 12 Hypothetical loop lines added into the Amtrak rail network: (a) Loop Line 1; (b) 
Loop Line 2. 
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Table 4.5 and Figure 4.13 show the changes in the network vulnerability due to the failure of 10 
nodes in the Great Lakes area after adding two loop lines. After adding the loop line 1, the 
network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes 64 and 450 has been significantly reduced to 
almost zero. The same phenomenon occurs on the node 449 and 448. However, the network 
vulnerability due to the failure of node 356, 443, 444, 445, 446 and 447 increases. These nodes 
can be regarded as falling outside the circle where node 64 or 450 is the center and loop line 1 is 
the arc. Therefore, loop line 2 is designed to cover more critical nodes and links inside the circle. 
After adding the loop line 2, the vulnerability due to the failure of all ten selected nodes have 
been reduced significantly to almost 0. However, the reduction magnitude of node 450 and 356 
is smaller than other nodes, because the loop line 2 does not connect all the branch links of the 
transfer node 450 and 356 due to geographical reasons (i.e., the loop line is difficult to build 
across lakes). If the loop line 2 is extended to pass through node 355, 357, 370, 461, 455, the 
network vulnerability due to the failure of node 450 and 356 can be reduced significantly to 
0.006 and 0.007, respectively, which demonstrates that adding a loop line is effective to reduce 
the network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes (Saadat et al. 2020). 
 
Table 4. 5 Comparison of loop lines' impact on network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes. 
 
aThese node numberings are provided in Figures 4.4.  
Ranking Station Numbering
a Original network Loop line 1 Loop line 2
1 Chicago (Union Station), Illinois 64 16.10% 0.78% 1.83%
2 Hammond-Whiting, Indiana 450 12.78% 0.41% 7.15%
3 Cleveland, Ohio 356 7.28% 8.27% 6.51%
4 South Bend, Indiana 449 5.89% 0.10% 0.25%
5 Elkhart, Indiana 448 5.73% 0.17% 0.16%
6 Waterloo, Indiana 447 5.61% 8.62% 0.14%
7 Bryan, Ohio 446 5.53% 6.99% 0.16%
8 Elyria, Ohio 443 5.50% 6.63% 0.53%
9 Toledo, Ohio 445 5.48% 6.81% 0.23%




Figure 4. 13 Comparison of loop lines' impact on network vulnerability due to the failure of 
nodes. 
 
Table 4.6 and Figure 4.14 show the impact of adding two loop lines on the 10 critical links in the 
Great Lakes area. After adding the loop line 1, the network vulnerability due to the failures of 
any links except 𝑒59,60 has been greatly reduced, because the loop line 1 does not cover the link 
between node 59 and 60 inside the circle, which may cause negative impacts on this link. Adding 







Table 4. 6 Comparison of loop lines' impact on network vulnerability due to the failure of links. 
 
aThese link numberings are automatically generated by Matlab program. 
 
 
Figure 4. 14 Comparison of loop lines' impact on network vulnerability due to the failure of 
links. 
 
Additionally, after adding hypothetical loop lines, the maximum network vulnerability of the 
Amtrak rail network needs to be assessed to examine the impact of loop lines on the entire 
network. Table 4.7 summarizes the change in the network efficiency, characteristic path length 
and vulnerability of the entire Amtrak network. As a result, adding the loop line 1, which 
Ranking Link Numbering
a Original network Loop line 1 Loop line 2
1 (69,70) 71 7.97% 0.01% 0.07%
2 (63,64) 65 4.43% 0.03% 0.06%
3 (62,63) 64 4.08% 0.04% 0.06%
4 (61,62) 63 3.78% 1.36% 0.12%
5 (64,65) 66 3.52% 0.09% 0.13%
6 (60,61) 62 3.51% 0.13% 1.93%
7 (70,71) 72 3.29% 0.22% 1.36%
8 (59,60) 61 3.27% 3.98% 0.25%
9 (79,80) 80 3.23% 0.77% 0.79%
10 (71,72) 73 3.12% 0.05% 0.02%
Vulnerability
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contains only 7, links improves the overall network efficiency by 9.1 percent and reduces the 
network vulnerability by 46.5 percent. Adding the loop line 2, which contains only 5 links, 
improves the overall network efficiency by 15.5 percent and reduces the network vulnerability 
by 46.6 percent. Therefore, adding a loop line can effectively enhance the topology of the 
Amtrak rail network.  
 
Table 4. 7 The impact of adding loop lines on the entire Amtrak rail network. 
 
 
4.1.2.4 Recovery Strategies for Node 64 
The most critical node 64 (i.e., Chicago (Union Station)) plays an essential role in the Amtrak 
rail network. Assuming a disruptive event of node 64 and its connected links, the optimal 







 are disrupted, 1 node and 6 links 
need to be repaired to recover the network efficiency fully. Assuming only one component can 
be repaired in a recovery stage, the number of all possible recovery sequences is equal to 5,040, 
i.e., the permutation of 7. The resilience index can be calculated as Equation (3.31) by assuming 
that the time of each recovery stage is constant and that the network efficiency will not be 
recovered by the repair of links before the node is repaired.  
 
Network type Network efficiency Characteristic path length Network vulnerability
Original network 0.0463 35.40 16.10%
Network with loop line 1 0.0505 32.26 8.62%
Network with loop line 2 0.0535 30.12 8.60%
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The initial network efficiency is equal to 0.0464, and the network efficiency decreases to 0.0388 
after the disruption of node 64 and its connected links. Figure 4.15 through Figure 4.18 (a) show 
the comparison of recovery triangles. Table 4.8 and Figure 4.18 (b) show the top 10 resilience 
index values of different recovery sequences. Recovery sequence s64- (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,65)- 
(64,363)- (64,271)- (362,64) is identified as optimal, with the largest value of resilience index 
0.9275, which means if node 64 and its connected links are disrupted, node 64 should be repaired 




, followed by link 𝑒64,271
, and finally link 𝑒362,64
. 
 
Table 4. 8 Top 10 Resilience index for the sequential recovery strategies of node 64. 
 
 
Ranking Recovery sequence Re
1 s 64 - (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,65)- (64,363)- (64,271)- (362,64) 0.9275
2 s 64 - (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,65)- (64,271)- (64,363)- (362,64) 0.9264
3 s 64 - (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,363)- (64,65)- (64,271)- (362,64) 0.9263
4 s 64 - (64,450)- (64,65)- (63,64)- (64,363)- (64,271)- (362,64) 0.9261
5 s 64 - (64,450)- (64,65)- (63,64)- (64,271)- (64,363)- (362,64) 0.9251
6 s 64 - (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,65)- (64,363)- (362,64)- (64,271) 0.9246
7 s 64 - (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,271)- (64,65)- (64,363)- (362,64) 0.9244
8 s 64 - (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,363)- (64,271)- (64,65)- (362,64) 0.9240
9 s 64 - (64,450)- (64,65)- (64,363)- (63,64)- (64,271)- (362,64) 0.9235
10 s 64 - (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,363)- (64,65)- (362,64)- (64,271) 0.9234
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Figure 4. 15 (a) Node 64 repaired in the first order; (b) Node 64 repaired in the second order. 
 
 
Figure 4. 16 (a) Node 64 repaired in the third order; (b) Node 64 repaired in the fourth order. 
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Figure 4. 17 (a) Node 64 repaired in the fifth order; (b) Node 64 repaired in the sixth order. 
 
 
Figure 4. 18 (a) Node 64 repaired in the seventh order; (b) Top 10 resilience index. 
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4.2 Case Study2: Class I Rail Network 
4.2.1 Mapping the Class I Rail Network 
Each Class I railroad entity owns and operates its own rail network. However, the Class I entities 
can also share their rails with each other. Therefore, in this thesis, the Class I rail network is 
regarded as a whole for analysis and research, which serves more than 40,000 stations and 
130,000 miles of rails in North America, including 46 states, Washington D.C. in the United 
States and several Canadian provinces. Compared to the metro and the Amtrak passenger rail 
networks, the Class I rail network has a larger number of nodes and links, and overly 
complicated connectivity patterns, which means the topology analysis and vulnerability 
assessment for the Class I rail network are very difficult. In order to improve efficiency while 
ensuring the accuracy of the analysis, the following method is proposed: selecting a part of nodes 
and links, then, reducing the size of the Class I rail network (i.e., reduce the number of nodes and 
links without changing the overall network connectivity):  
1. The analysis of the Amtrak rail network indicates that the node density of areas has a 
great impact on the arrangement of critical nodes and links. Therefore, according to the 
actual number of Class I rail network stations, the number of nodes is selected in each 
state proportionally to ensure that the ratio of node density of each area remains 
unchanged; 
2. All transfer nodes must be considered first during the process of reducing the network 
size, because they are the key components of network connectivity; and 
3. Selecting more nodes on the longer rails can minimize the impact of link lengths, 
building an unweighted rail network. 
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Based on these three principles, the Class I rail network with 638 nodes and 860 links is defined 
and mapped. The network vector is specified as follows: 
 
 𝐺 = [638,860] (4.2) 
 
The Class I rail network can be divided into six areas depending on geographic locations: 
northwest (NW), southwest (SW), Great Lakes (GL), central south (CS), southeast (SE), and 
northeast (NE) areas. Figure 4.19 to 4.24 show the graph and numbering of the Class I rail 
network in each area. 
 
 
Figure 4. 19 Graph of the northwest area including Washington, Oregon, Idaho, Montana, 




Figure 4. 20 Graph of the southwest area including California, Nevada, Utah, Arizona, Colorado, 
and New Mexico. 
 
 
Figure 4. 21 Graph of the Great Lakes area including Minnesota, Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, 
Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio. 
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Figure 4. 22 Graph of the central south area including Kansas, Missouri, Oklahoma, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, and Texas. 
 
 
Figure 4. 23 Graph of the southeast area including Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina, 
Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida. 
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Figure 4. 24 Graph of the northeast area including Kentucky, West Virginia, Virginia, Maryland, 
Washington, D.C., Delaware, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, 
Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. 
 
4.2.2 Results and Analysis 
4.2.2.1 Topology Analysis of the Class I Rail Network 
The size of the adjacency matrix for the Class I rail network is 638 × 638. Table 4.9 summarizes 
the results of the Class I rail network’s topological indicators. Compared with the Amtrak rail 
network, the characteristic path length and diameter of the Class I rail network have been 
lowered significantly, which means that the Class I rail network is more efficient and developed 
than the Amtrak rail network. Additionally, the local clustering coefficient indicates that the 
nodes of the Class I rail network are more clustered in local areas than the Amtrak rail network. 
The network topology characteristics reflected by topological indicators are consistent with the 
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Class I rail network as shown in Figure 4.25, indicating that the connectivity is accurately 
depicted after reducing the size of the Class I rail network.  
 
Table 4. 9 Topological indicators of the Class I rail network. 
 
 
4.2.2.2 Vulnerability Assessment of the Class I Rail Network 
Table 4.10 shows the top 40 most critical nodes and Table 4.11 demonstrates the top 40 most 
critical links. Therefore, the vulnerability of the Class I rail network is equal to 0.0295. 
Compared with the vulnerability of the Amtrak network, the network vulnerability due to the 
failure of nodes and links in the Class I rail network has been dropped dramatically. This 
demonstrates that the Class I rail network is more developed and robust than the Amtrak rail 
network, because when any component is disrupted, more alternative paths in the Class I rail 






No. Topological Indicators Values Notes
1 Average node degree 2.696 /
2 Network density 0.004 /
3 Characteristic path length 16.726 /
4 Diameter of the network 46 /
5 Local clustering coefficient 0.033 Ignore nodes with node degree 1
6 Global network efficiency 0.085 /
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Table 4. 10 Top 40 critical nodes of the Class I rail network. 
 
aNW (northwest area), SW (southwest area), GL (the Great Lakes area), CS (central south area), 








a Node Numbering Node Degree Vulnerability
1 New York NE 29 5 2.95%
2 Missouri CS 280 7 2.85%
3 lLLinois GL 341 6 2.01%
4 Alabama SE 222 5 1.80%
5 Florida SE 207 6 1.63%
6 Tennessee SE 235 5 1.51%
7 Minnesota GL 407 8 1.42%
8 Michigan GL 151 6 1.22%
9 lLLinois GL 363 7 1.20%
10 New York NE 31 3 1.19%
11 lLLinois GL 340 8 1.18%
12 Alabama SE 219 2 1.14%
13 Ohio GL 119 3 1.10%
14 Colorado SW 521 6 1.09%
15 Massachusetts NE 16 3 1.02%
16 Ohio GL 120 3 1.01%
17 Washington NW 576 3 1.00%
18 New York NE 34 4 0.98%
19 Virginia NE 127 3 0.98%
20 Texas CS 494 6 0.97%
21 New York NE 30 2 0.96%
22 Indiana GL 320 4 0.94%
23 Indiana GL 336 4 0.93%
24 Massachusetts NE 18 3 0.91%
25 Pennsylvania NE 51 3 0.86%
26 Indiana GL 338 4 0.82%
27 Virginia NE 129 4 0.78%
28 lLLinois GL 368 4 0.71%
29 New Hampshire NE 7 2 0.70%
30 lLLinois GL 356 6 0.67%
31 Michigan GL 142 3 0.66%
32 Kansas CS 443 3 0.66%
33 Kansas CS 444 3 0.65%
34 Massachusetts NE 13 2 0.64%
35 New York NE 32 2 0.63%
36 Alabama SE 223 4 0.58%
37 Virginia NE 128 2 0.57%
38 Pennsylvania NE 52 3 0.56%
39 Louisiana CS 255 6 0.56%
40 Ohio GL 114 4 0.55%
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Table 4. 11 Top 40 critical links of the Class I freight network. 
 
a NW (northwest area), SW (southwest area), GL (the Great Lakes area), CS (central south area), 
SE (southeast area), and NE (northeast area). 
 
Figure 4.25 shows the arrangement of the Class I rail network’s top 40 critical nodes, where blue 
circles indicate the top 20 critical nodes and green circles are the top 21-40 critical nodes. 
Compared with the Amtrak rail network, the top 40 critical nodes of the Class I rail network are 
scattered instead of being concentrated in any area. Figure 4.26 demonstrates the arrangement of 
No. Starting Node Ending Node Area
a Vulnerability 
1 181 244 SE 1.15%
2 170 242 SE 1.13%
3 31 32 NE 1.09%
4 7 18 NE 0.99%
5 35 37 NE 0.97%
6 13 16 NE 0.94%
7 124 125 NE 0.89%
8 282 363 GL 0.88%
9 6 7 NE 0.81%
10 37 38 NE 0.74%
11 12 13 NE 0.74%
12 33 35 NE 0.73%
13 53 54 NE 0.71%
14 38 40 NE 0.68%
15 126 127 NE 0.65%
16 582 583 NW 0.65%
17 4 6 NE 0.65%
18 129 135 NE 0.64%
19 143 145 GL 0.63%
20 131 136 NE 0.59%
21 446 448 CS 0.58%
22 11 12 NE 0.55%
23 379 380 GL 0.53%
24 34 14 NE 0.53%
25 32 34 NE 0.50%
26 307 236 NE 0.50%
27 553 555 NW 0.48%
28 624 625 SW 0.48%
29 576 577 NW 0.47%
30 309 236 NE 0.46%
31 216 238 SE 0.44%
32 606 607 SW 0.44%
33 581 582 NW 0.43%
34 125 131 NE 0.42%
35 412 534 NW 0.42%
36 507 509 CS 0.42%
37 123 129 NE 0.41%
38 48 49 NE 0.41%
39 87 134 NE 0.40%
40 248 249 SE 0.40%
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the Class I rail network’s top 40 critical links, where blue squares indicate the top 20 critical 
nodes and green squares are the top 21-40 critical links. More than 75 percent of the top 20 
critical links are concentrated in the northeast area. Additionally, the most critical node 29 is also 
located in this area. As a result, the northeast area of the Class I rail network is identified as the 
most critical area. 
 
 
Figure 4. 25 Arrangement of the Class I rail network’s top 40 critical nodes.  
(Purchased, permitted and edited from Mapsofworld.com. (2020). US Railroad Map, US 
Railway Map, USA Rail Map for Routes. <https://www.mapsofworld.com/usa/usa-rail-




Figure 4. 26 Arrangement of the Class I rail network’s top 40 critical links.  
(Purchased, permitted and edited from Mapsofworld.com. (2020). US Railroad Map, US 
Railway Map, USA Rail Map for Routes. <https://www.mapsofworld.com/usa/usa-rail-
map.html> (Accessed 31 May 2020).) 
  
Based on the analysis of the Amtrak rail network, critical nodes are concentrated in the typical 
connectivity pattern 1 in areas with high node density. However, critical nodes of the Class I rail 
network are not concentrated in any areas but are scattered in almost all areas. Table 4.12 
demonstrates the comparison of the Class I rail network’s six areas. Node density is the number 
of nodes per unit area. Diameter of an area is defined as the maximum value of the shortest path 
length between all pairs of nodes in this area. In this table, the value in each column is also the 
ratio between any two areas’ characteristics. From Table 4.12, the differences in characteristics 
between the Class I rail network’s six areas are small with the exception of node density, which 
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is similar to the analysis result of the Amtrak rail network. Additionally, the differences in node 
density between the Class I rail network’s areas are smaller than the Amtrak rail network, which 
may explain why the top 40 critical nodes of the Class I rail network are scattered in each area 
rather than being concentrated on one or two areas. 
 
Table 4. 12 Comparison of the Class I rail network’s six areas. 
 
 
Figure 4.27 shows the correlation between network vulnerability due to node failures and the 
node degree of failed node for the Class I rail network. In this case, network vulnerability is not 
positively linear correlated with the node degree. Because in the Class I rail network, many loop 
lines are around the nodes with larger node degree, which greatly reduces the network 
vulnerability due to node failures, thereby reducing the correlation between node vulnerability 
and node degree. For example, nodes 340 in the Class I rail network has the same location and 
largest node degree as nodes 64 in the Amtrak rail network. However, the vulnerability due to 
the failure of node 340 in the Class I rail network has dropped significantly. From Figure 4.21, 
several loop lines are around nodes 340. One of the loop lines is 𝑒342,343, 𝑒343,345, 𝑒345,348, 
𝑒348,351, 𝑒351,356, 𝑒356,361, and 𝑒361,365. Another loop line is  𝑒343,344, 𝑒344,346, 𝑒346,349, 𝑒349,353, 
𝑒353,358, 𝑒358,360, and 𝑒360,364. These loop lines significantly reduce the criticality of nodes 340. 
Area Node Density Average Node Degree Characteristic Path Length Diameter
Northwest 1.25 1.12 1.32 1.40
Southwest 1.00 1.11 1.08 1.07
Great Lakes 3.52 1.31 1.27 1.40
Central South 2.02 1.30 1.00 1.00
Southeast 3.01 1.16 1.07 1.13
Northeast 4.26 1.00 1.67 1.87
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When node 340 and its connected links are disrupted, loop lines create redundancy and can be 
used as alternative routes leading to the reduction in network vulnerability. For example, if node 
340 is disrupted, the shortest path length from node 378 to node 352 is 9 with loop lines, while 
the shortest path length becomes 17 without loop lines. Figure 4.28 shows the changes in the 
network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes 340 and 407 after losing loop lines around 
them. Afterward, the correlation coefficient between network vulnerability due to node failures 
and node degree for the top 20 critical nodes increases to 0.6814. 
 
 
Figure 4. 27 Correlation between network vulnerability due to node failures and the node degree 




Figure 4. 28 Changes in the network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes 340 and 407 after 
losing loop lines. 
 
Table 4.11and Figure 4.26 show the value and arrangement of the top 40 critical links. Compared 
with the Amtrak rail network, the network vulnerability due to the failure of links for the Class I 
rail network has dropped significantly, and 75 percent of the top 20 critical links are concentrated 
in the northeast area with the highest node density. Additionally, most of the top 40 critical links 
are located in the typical connectivity pattern 1 or the line with the “end-node,” which is the 
same as the conclusion of the Amtrak rail network.  
 
4.2.2.3 Topology Enhancement of the Class I Rail Network 
Depending on the vulnerability assessment, the northeast area is identified as the most critical 
area of the Class I rail network. A hypothetical loop line is added around the most critical node 
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29 to create redundancy for the northeast area, enhancing the network topology and reducing the 
vulnerability. In this section, the vulnerability changes in 6 nodes (i.e., nodes 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 
and 16) and 9 links (i.e., 𝑒31,32, 𝑒35,37, 𝑒13,16, 𝑒37,38, 𝑒12,13, 𝑒33,35, 𝑒38,40, 𝑒34,14, and 𝑒32,34) in 
the northeast area are examined to verify if the topology enhancement is applicable to the Class I 
rail network.  
 
The hypothetical loop line for the Class I rail network connects existing nodes consisting of 7 
links: 𝑒25,26, 𝑒26,10, 𝑒10,17, 𝑒17,21, 𝑒21,39, 𝑒39,40, and 𝑒40,49, which is the yellow line as shown in 
Figure 4.29.  
 
 
Figure 4. 29 Hypothetical loop lines added into the Class I rail network.  
 
Table 4.13 and Figure 4.30 show the changes in network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes 
in the northeast area after adding the hypothetical loop line. All examined nodes fall inside the 
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circle where node 29 is the center, and the loop line is the arc. Therefore, the vulnerability due to 
the failure of nodes 31, 16, 34, 30, and 32 has been reduced significantly to almost zero. Also, the 
vulnerability due to the failure of node 29 has been reduced by half. As a result, adding loop lines 
in the Class I rail network effectively reduces the network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes. 
 
Table 4. 13 Changes in network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes after adding a loop line. 
 
aThese node numberings are provided in Figure 4.24.  
 
 
Figure 4. 30 Changes in network vulnerability due to the failure of nodes after adding a loop line. 
 
Ranking Numbering
a Area Original network Loop line
1 29 NE 2.95% 1.43%
2 31 NE 1.19% 0.087%
3 16 NE 1.02% 0.026%
4 34 NE 0.98% 0.092%
5 30 NE 0.96% 0.112%
6 32 NE 0.63% 0.036%
Vulnerability
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Table 4.14 and Figure 4.31 show the changes in network vulnerability due to the failure of links 
in the northeast area after adding the hypothetical loop line. All examined links are located inside 
the circle. Therefore, adding the hypothetical loop line causes the positive impacts on the 
examined links, reducing network vulnerability significantly.  
 
Table 4. 14 Changes in network vulnerability due to the failure of links after adding a loop line.  
 
aThese link numberings are automatically generated by Matlab program. 
 
 
Figure 4. 31 Changes in network vulnerability due to the failure of links after adding a loop line. 
Ranking Link Numbering
a Original network Loop line 1 
1 (31,32) 43 1.09% 0.10%
2 (35,37) 47 0.97% 0.32%
3 (13,16) 15 0.94% 0.024%
4 (37,38) 49 0.74% 0.099%
5 (12,13) 14 0.74% 0.009%
6 (33,35) 45 0.73% 0.390%
7 (38,40) 51 0.68% 0.091%
8 (34,14) 17 0.53% 0.055%
9 (32,34) 44 0.50% 0.083%
10 (71,72) 73 3.12% 0.05%
Vulnerability
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Additionally, after adding loop lines, the maximum network vulnerability of the Class I rail 
network needs to be assessed to examine the impact of the addition of loop lines on the entire Class 
I rail network. Table 4.15 summarizes the changes in the efficiency, characteristic path length, and 
the vulnerability of the entire Class I rail network. The entire network has been enhanced slightly, 
indicating that adding a loop line in the northeast area cannot effectively enhance the topology of 
the entire Class I rail network. As a result, for the Class I rail network with complex and developed 
connectivity among nodes and links, more hypothetical loop lines need to be designed and added 
in several areas rather than the most critical area to enhance the topology of the entire network.  
 
Table 4. 15 Impacts of adding the loop line on the entire Class I rail network. 
 
 
4.2.2.4 Recovery Strategies for Node 29 
The most critical node 29 plays a critical role in the Class I rail network. Assuming potential 
failures lead to the disruption of node 29 and its connected links, the optimal recovery sequence 
that generates the largest value of resilience index needs to be determined to enhance the 






are disrupted, 1 node and 6 links need to be repaired to recover the network efficiency fully. 
Assuming only one component can be repaired in a recovery stage, the number of all possible 
recovery sequences is equal to 720, i.e., the permutation of 6. The resilience index can be 
Network type Network efficiency Characteristic path length Network vulnerability
Original network 0.085 16.73 2.95%
Network with the loop line 0.0863 16.54 2.84%
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calculated using Equation (3.31) by assuming that the time of each recovery stage is constant and 
that the network efficiency will not be recovered by the repair of links before the node repair.  
The initial network efficiency is equal to 0.085, and the network efficiency decreases to 0.0828 
after the disruption of node 29 and its connected links.  
 
Figure 4.32 to Figure 4.34 show the comparison of recovery triangles. In Figure 4.32, repairing a 
link has negative impacts on the recovery of network efficiency. The reason for the occurrence of 
this phenomenon is that after repairing a node, the number of nodes is also increased by one 
when calculating network efficiency. Depending on Equation 3.29, the network efficiency 
decreases when the denominator increases more than the numerator. Table 4.16 and Figure 4.35 
show the top 10 resilience index values of different recovery sequences. Therefore, if node 29 
and its connected links are disrupted, link 𝑒29,151
 should be repaired first, then node 29, link 
𝑒29,30
, 𝑒29,51
, followed by link 𝑒29,33
, and finally link 𝑒29,144
. 
 
Table 4. 16 Top 10 resilience index for the sequential recovery strategies of node 29.  
 
Ranking Recovery sequence Re
1 (29,151)- s 29 - (29,30)- (29,51)- (29,33)- (29,144) 0.9835
2 s 29 - (29,30)- (29,151)- (29,51)- (29,33)- (29,144) 0.9833
3 (29,151)- s 29 - (29,33)- (29,30)- (29,51)- (29,144) 0.9826
4 s 29 - (29,151)- (29,30)- (29,51)- (29,144)- (29,33) 0.9825
5 s 29 - (29,33)- (29,151)- (29,30)- (29,51)- (29,144) 0.9824
6 s 29 - (29,30)- (29,151)- (29,51)- (29,144)- (29,33) 0.9823
7 (29,151)- s 29 - (29,33)- (29,51)- (29,30)- (29,144) 0.9816
8 s 29 - (29,51)- (29,30)- (29,151)- (29,33)- (29,144) 0.9815
9 s 29 - (29,33)- (29,151)- (29,51)- (29,30)- (29,144) 0.9814
10 s 29 - (29,30)- (29,151)- (29,144)- (29,33)- (29,51) 0.9813
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Figure 4. 32 (a) Node 29 repaired in the first order; (b) Node 29 repaired in the second order. 
 
 
Figure 4. 33 (a) Node 29 repaired in the third order; (b) Node 29 repaired in the fourth order. 
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Figure 4. 34 (a) Node 29 repaired in the fifth order; (b) Node 29 repaired in the sixth order. 
 
 
Figure 4. 35 Top 10 resilience index. 
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4.3 Discussion of the Proposed Methodology Results 
The methodology proposed in Chapter 3 is applied to analyze the Amtrak and Class I rail 
networks from the topological perspectives, and to further reduce the impacts of potential 
failures. The calculation of topological indicators, such as average node degree, characteristic 
path length, and local clustering coefficient, can well describe the arrangement of and the 
connectivity among these two networks’ components. The topology enhancement and sequential 
recovery strategies succeed in reducing the vulnerability and enhancing the resilience of the 
Amtrak and Class I rail networks based on the vulnerability assessment to identify the critical 
components and area. 
 
4.3.1 Summaries of the Amtrak Rail Network  
The Amtrak rail network contains 529 nodes and 552 links and can be divided into five areas as 
shown in Figure 4.2 to Figure 4.6. The size of the Amtrak rail network’s adjacency matrix is 
529 × 529. Using the equations in Chapter 3 to calculate the indicators can effectively analyze 
the topology of the Amtrak rail network. Table 4.1 summarizes the results of the Amtrak rail 
network’s topological indicators.  
 
The size of matrices and the number of iterations in the vulnerability assessment of the Amtrak 
rail network is also not overly large. Table 4.2 shows the top 40 most critical nodes and Table 
4.3 demonstrates the top 40 most critical links. These critical nodes and links are identified as the 
critical components of the Amtrak rail network. Based on the arrangement of the critical 
components as shown in Figure 4.7 and 4.8, the Great Lakes area is identified as the critical area 
of the Amtrak rail network. Additionally, most of the critical nodes of the Amtrak rail network 
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are the nodes with a large node degree located in the typical connectivity pattern 1 of high node 
density areas. Most critical links of the Amtrak rail network are located in the typical 
connectivity pattern 1 or the line with the “end-node” of high node density areas. 
 
The topology enhancement and sequential recovery strategies are used to reduce the impacts of 
potential failures on the Amtrak rail network by reducing vulnerability and enhancing resilience. 
Table 4.5 to 4.7 and Figure 4.13 to 4.14 indicate that adding a proper loop line in the critical area 
of the Amtrak rail network can effectively reduce the network vulnerability and improve the 
network efficiency. Additionally, the resilience of the Amtrak rail network can be well measured 
based on the changes in network efficiency. After node 64 and its connected links are disrupted, 
recovery sequence s64- (64,450)- (63,64)- (64,65)- (64,363)- (64,271)- (362,64) is identified as 
the optimal one with the largest value of resilience index 0.9275.  
 
In summary, the proposed methodology can be used effectively to analyze the topology, 
vulnerability, and resilience of the Amtrak rail network. The topology enhancement and 
sequential recovery strategies are also applicable to the Amtrak network to reduce the impacts of 
potential failures.  
 
4.3.2 Summaries of the Class I Rail Network  
The real Class I rail network contains more than 40,000 nodes and links. The size of the Amtrak 
rail network’s adjacency matrix is beyond 40000 × 40000. In addition, when calculating the 
network vulnerability, the number of iterations exceeds 128 trillion. Therefore, measuring the 
topological indicators and vulnerability of the Class I rail network is extremely difficult and 
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inefficient. In this case, the size of the Class I rail network is reduced to 638 nodes and 860 links 
using the method described in section 4.2.1, while keeping the connectivity of the Class I rail 
network unchanged. Table 4.9 summarizes the results of the Class I rail network’s topological 
indicators, indicating that the Class I rail network is more efficient and developed than the 
Amtrak rail network.  
 
Table 4.10 shows the top 40 most critical nodes and Table 4.11 demonstrates the top 40 most 
critical links. These critical nodes and links are identified as the critical components of the Class 
I rail network. Based on the arrangement of the critical components as shown in Figure 4.25 and 
4.26, the northeast area is identified as the critical area of the Class I rail network. Compared 
with the Amtrak rail network, the critical nodes of the Class I rail network are more scattered 
instead of being concentrated in any area. Meanwhile, critical nodes with greater vulnerability 
may not have a larger node degree. Most of the critical links of the Class I rail network are still 
located in the typical connectivity pattern 1 or the line with the “end-node” of high node density 
areas. 
 
Table 4.13 to 4.15 and Figure 4.30 to 4.31 indicate that adding a proper loop line in the critical 
area of the Class I rail network can still effectively reduce the vulnerability due to the failure of 
nodes and links in the critical area. However, the network efficiency, characteristic path length, 
and the maximum network vulnerability of the Class I rail network has been enhanced slightly. 
Additionally, the optimal recovery sequence for node 29 can also be determined with respect to 
the largest resilience index.  
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In summary, after reducing the size of the Class I rail network, the proposed methodology can be 
well used to analyze the network topology, vulnerability, and resilience accurately and 
effectively. Also, the topology enhancement and sequential recovery strategy is applicable to the 































Chapter 5: Conclusions  
Rail networks are real-life examples of complex networks and critical logistic and economic 
contributors to the wellbeing of society. The potential failures of rail networks due to natural or 
human-caused hazards can cause disruptions, leading to severe consequences including 
significant economic impacts. This thesis proposes a methodology to analyze rail networks with 
a large number of nodes, links, and complex connectivity from the topological perspectives and 
further evaluate and reduce the impacts of potential failures on rail networks. Based on the 
analysis of two case studies: the Amtrak and Class I rail networks, it can be concluded that the 
proposed methodology is appropriate and well suited to analyze the topology, vulnerability, and 
resilience of complex rail networks effectively and efficiently. The results also indicate that 
topology enhancements and recovery strategies are applicable to rail networks in order to reduce 
vulnerability and enhance resilience. 
 
The network topology, defined as the arrangement and connectivity among components, can be 
clearly depicted, quantified, and assessed using complex network theory. Additionally, under the 
premise of ensuring network connectivity remains unchanged, the size of rail networks with an 
overly large number of components were reduced, successfully increasing the efficiency of 
analysis, and breaking through the current limitations on rail network analysis. In comparing the 
two analyzed networks in this thesis, the Class I rail network is more complicated, efficient, and 
developed than the Amtrak rail network.  
 
The vulnerability of rail networks is a critical factor in evaluating the impacts of node and link 
disruptions due to potential failures. The vulnerability of rail networks is measured to compare 
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the impact of all possible failures on the networks. The reduction in the size of the Class I rail 
network ensures the analysis of the network vulnerability is effective and efficient. The critical 
areas can be clearly depicted and identified depending on the arrangement of the most critical 
nodes and links.  
 
This thesis provides and examines a pre-failure topology enhancement strategy to reduce the 
impact of potential failures by adding hypothetical loop lines in critical areas to reduce network 
vulnerability. The vulnerability of most critical components can be reduced to almost zero, 
indicating that inserting a proper hypothetical loop line can significantly reduce the vulnerability 
of components in the critical areas. Furthermore, the results also reflect that in a network, such as 
the Amtrak rail network, adding loop lines in an area can effectively increase the entire network 
efficiency and reduce the network vulnerability. However, in some networks with overly 
complicated connectivity, such as the Class I rail network, adding loop lines in an area may not 
effectively enhance the entire network. Other hypothetical loop lines need to be examined in 
future work by adding them in several areas rather than the most critical area.  
 
Network efficiency assessment also provides a basis to measure the resilience index based on 
assumed recovery sequences. The resilience index is used to quantify the ability of rail networks 
to withstand and recover from the failure of components. In order to enhance network resilience 
due to the failure of the most critical node (i.e., station) and its connected links (i.e., rails), this 
thesis compares all possible recovery sequences and ranks them with respect to the 
corresponding resilience index values. The recovery sequence with the largest resilience index 
value represents the best recovery strategy. In this case, after a failure occurs, the overall loss of 
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network efficiency can be effectively minimized to reduce impacts. It should be emphasized that 
the repair of nodes (i.e., stations) is essential in the sequential recovery strategy, which may 
significantly affect the restoration of network efficiency.  
  
Future work can focus on combining several kinds of data sources to analyze the rail networks, 
such as travel time, passenger or freight flow, distance, and train routes. By inputting such data, 
the railroad blocking or traveling salesman problem can be solved to optimize the railroad’s 
operations. In addition, inputting the disruption-related historical data can help us to investigate 
the probability of disruption occurrences and to assess potential disruptions and their impacts on 
rail networks.  
 
Finally, the reduced Class I rail network is intended to select and analyze a subset of nodes in the 
network while keeping the network connectivity unchanged. For different analysis purposes, 
additional nodes need to be added to the subset and analyzed. The recovery strategy in this thesis 
is only for the disruption case of one node and links connected to it. The same recovery analysis 
process can be used to determine the recovery strategies for practical situations according to 
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